where in the middle of the 1970s the momentum seems to have been lost. Increasing scepticism of detente was spreading in the United States. The end of Soviet-American detente came with the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in late December 1979. The detente-positive Carter administration shifted policy. Clearly, the perceptions differed in Europe and in America. Decision-makers and opinion-leaders in Europe were less indignant than were their American counterparts over the Soviet actions. Thus, detente took different routes; more of the fruits of detente remained in the intra-European relations than in the American-Soviet ones. Detente ceased to be a positive concept for the latter, but continued to be useful for the former.
The crises over Poland and over the deployment of new missiles in Europe further intensified the conflicts between the USA and the USSR. By the end of 1984 the relations between the two major powers had thus arrived at a stage of neither detente nor a Second Cold War. Some aspects of the Cold War were still lacking; inter-German and intra-European relations were not as confrontational as they had been in the 1950s (Ostpolitik remained and there were no new Berlin crises), and no war was going on with direct or heavy indirect involvement of both major powers on opposite sides (as had been the case in Korea and in Indochina). Typically, the only negotiations that continued constructively were those directly relating to the European scene (the Vienna talks on force reductions, the Stockholm conference on confidence-building measures). However, also here progress was slow, suggesting that European issues could not be entirely divorced from American-Soviet relations.
Thus, there is a need to evaluate what went wrong with American-Soviet detente. One simple explanation would be to say that the wrong President was elected in the United States. However, it is somewhat superficial only to point to a particular American President; after all, a President is not that omnipotent. To a considerable extent a President is a victim or a result of pressures building up internally, rather than a master or a conductor of opinions and special interests. Thus, it is more fruitful to analyse what took place in the United States as a whole during the 1970s.
Another simple explanation would give the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, which indicated Soviet adventurism and expansionism, exploiting opportunities to its own advantage. Certainly, this was the way the Soviet Union was perceived in large sectors of the American population, not the least by the incumbent President. Again there is a longer story. For several years, the Soviet Union had embarked on policies, particularly in Africa, but also in Afghanistan, which seemed to culminate in the 1979 invasion. Thus, as much as Reagan might have been the result of a more fundamental shift in American sentiments, the invasion of Afghanistan might in fact also have been an expression of more general Soviet ambitions. Still, Afghanistan marked the end of detente, as well as the end of a gradual demise of detente. Frustrated expectations were abundant on both sides.
In Relating to this, but to some extent subsidiary, was the second purpose of detente: to limit the nuclear arms race. Thus, the partial test ban treaty was concluded in 1963, but with little hope of a continuation, because both still wanted to keep the option of having additional nuclear weapons and to keep their existing arsenals intact. Rather than to achieve nuclear disarmament, the purpose was to slow down and direct the arms race (arms control). Additionally, the two agreed on the need to prevent nuclear weapons proliferation (NPT 1968 Furthermore, this is to suggest that the common interest was, in fact, highly limited, and of almost a technical nature: to manage conflict escalation, to develop not-sodangerous force structures and to make a good profit on top of it all. The profound joint interest that, for instance, is to be found between allied powers fighting a war together, was not there. Almost to the contrary: Soviet references to such a joint interest always seemed to evoke unpleasant reminiscences on the American side, such as 'we gave away too much in Yalta!.
Detente, as the parties themselves saw it, was a policy to regulate a fundamentally irreconcilable relationship. Thus, it is not surprising that the parties mostly used different names for the relations they were constructing together; their analyses of why they were doing what they were doing were highly divergent. The common interest was nuclear war avoidance, and most other aspects appeared subordinated to this or became means to achieve this. This joint interest was to be achieved together with the preservation of the existing social orders. Thus, if the period prior to detente emphasized such social order values (American-type Capitalism vs. Soviettype Socialism), detente made nuclear war avoidance a goal of equal magnitude, but not a superior one. Both interests were to be met at the same time. The demise of detente consequently meant a return to the previous preference order, again making the social order values the more important ones.
Assumptions of detente
To achieve nuclear war avoidance and system maintenance at the same time, the detente policy was constructed on seven assumptions. The fate of detente lies not so much in its purpose, as in these in-built assumptions. One by one, they turned out to be unrealistic, and, consequently, the overall purpose of a constructive and predictable relationship could not be achieved.
'Success' was to be found in the Third World rather than in Europe
As the competition between the two superpowers and their social system was 'inevitable, as both perceived it, it required a less dangerous area to be played out in. The crises of 1957-1961 showed the dangers of a confrontation in Berlin and Germany; nuclear weapons were in abundance, the warning time was minimal, the devastation would be enormous.
At about the same time, decolonization processes resulted in new possibilities for competition. The superpowers could simply estimate their influence on the newly independent nations as their measure of success. 
'Continued but controlled' arms race
During the entire period of detente the military stationary confrontation in Central Europe was left unaffected. The military buildup was pursued with modernization of the military machinery, including the nuclear arsenals. In the European Security Conference some limited measures of confidence building were agreed on, but troops remained right on the borders. Thus, the military threat was unceasing, the fear of attack was not reduced, and incidents kept tension high. Detente, however, seems to have implied from the start that this eye-to-eye confrontation in Central Europe was not so important. The focus was on nuclear weapons rather than on conventional forces.
The lack of effort in this area certainly reinforced the impression that AmericanSoviet detente policy was less one of building a new system of relations in Europe than one of cementing what was already there. Thus, it should be noted that German-German detente, less conspicuous but in the long run very important, seems to have continued unabated by the failure in American-Soviet relations, and in spite of regime changes in Germany itself.
The dangers of nuclear war were, according to detente thinking, to be decreased through reductions of dangerous nuclear weapons. However, during the 1960s the two superpowers enlarged their arsenals without any restrictions. The strategic arms negotiations were not initiated until the United States had finished its ambitious programme of a strategic triad. The first SALT agreement allowed for further arming by not curtailing modernization (i.e. mirving). Only when both saw the end of their modernization programmes could a second agreement be concluded, still allowing for further new weaponry, and having an effective ceiling operative only by 1985.
Thus the arms race continued in a not very controlled manner, increasing fear rather than injecting a persuasive feeling of control. As the arms themselves constitute such strong elements in generating fear, giving rise to worst case scenarios on the part of strategists and nightmares on the part of ordinary people, the absence of control over nuclear weapons served to undermine the credibility of detente. In fact, detente policy faced an unresolvable dilemma; to gain support from those with strategic and military interests the arms race could not be restricted too much, but to gain popular support it would have to be restricted a great deal. The different types of weapons, the different compositions of the force structure, the different programmes for development, all made any agreement difficult to interpret, and left apparent contradictions that provided arguments for the sceptics. Certainly, a policy aiming at reducing the danger of war and limiting the arms race would have to show a record of achievement at least in the latter field, to indicate that some headway had been made also with respect to the former. Detente did not achieve this.
3.5 CAn economic race is better than a military one, and we are the ones to race' Early on in the detente period, the idea was prevalent of making economic achievements an indicator of success for the two competing systems. Both systems expected increased international support to be gained by such successes, and military adventures would not be required. This competition, in some versions, would also apply to the main contenders themselves; the Soviet citizen was to eat as much meat as the American consumer by the 1980s, it was proclaimed.
The record on this score seems to have been a surprise to both, and gradually, this form of competition receded into the background. The most interesting economic developments during the period came from neither of the two. Rather, Japan turned out to be an engine, formally operating within a capitalist framework but with strongly centralized means (hardly a model either one of the superpowers could embrace). Certainly, this challenge created more problems for the United States than for the Soviet Union, resulting, inter alia, in a soy bean embargo and car import restrictions.
Furthermore, the developing countries took measures which were consonant with market mechanisms, but again hurt the leading proponents of free markets the most; the OPEC cartel increased prices, created shortages in the United States, and gave unexpected profits to the Soviet Union as it could increase its oil prices too (a move of solidarity?).
Finally, attention was drawn to a set of new models of development, contradicting the principles of socialism buit not compatible with the principle of democracy. The NIC economies of South Korea, Taiwan, Hongkong and other countries in Southeast Asia worked under capitalist rules, but not under democratic ones. Thus, again, the world did not fall into the neat boxes drawn by American and Soviet observers.
3.6 'What is good for us, is good for the World' An important aspect of detente was the preference for bilateralism, for a joint leadership of the leading nuclear powers against all the rest. In a spirit of enlighted duopoly the two superpowers (sometimes with Britain involved as well) sought to preserve their own hegemony and prevent an erosion of the existing hierarchy. The first substantial agreement concerned the partial test ban treaty, which allowed only such tests that the three signatories could carry out. Thus, they, for a while, drew a technological line between themselves and the rest. Similarly, the non-proliferation treaty tried to reserve weapon technology for those that already possessed it in exchange for arms reductions which never materialized.
This was even more marked in other instances, where immediate, not only potential, interests of others could be affected. In 1967-1968, some saw the emergence of a division of the world into two closed spheres; Czechoslovakia had its troubles in one, Greece in the other, which would be a way of reducing the dangers of confrontation between the two spheres, but would hardly further the development of the countries inside these spheres. Certainly, this was reminiscent of the developments in these two countries twenty years earlier! '
Others became suspicious about whether the superpowers were willing to pursue their allies' interests with sufficient energy. This The insistence that the parties are not comparable brought a particularly destabilizing element into the relationship. Primarily it meant that agreements became more difficult to conclude, as they had to be more precisely worded (the length of the SALT II agreement compared to the size of SALT I is indicative of this, although this is not the whole explanation). Verification became a more difficult problem. In general, agreements become less acceptable, if there is something fundamentally unreliable about the other signatory. Also, conflicts become more difficult to handle; each party will have a strong sense of selfrighteousness, and winll be inclined to make black/white pictures of each issue. As the parties are two, the analysis easily points to the existence of two polarized forces, distorting a mostly more complex reality, or rather, distorting the party's interpretation of its information about the reality.
Conclusion
Taken together, these assumptions about detente certainly do not provide much support for a given policy at a given point in time. Detente requires considerable effort, a good portion of luck, and there have to be some favourable developments on which to build. In particular, several of the assumptions result in internal inconsistencies (such as combining tension reduction with arms increases) as well as contradictions between the superpowers and the rest. of the world (such as attempting to deflect the conflict or act on behalf of others). Such inconsistencies, in turn, mean that an unclear message is communicated between the two, resulting in difficulties for them to interpret what the other is doing. Thus, a necessary and renewed attempt to create constructive and predictable relations between the two superpowers, preferably under some other heading than detente or peaceful coexistence, would have to come to grips with these inconsistencies. It cannot be done, however, without taking into account the interest of others. In fact, the choice seems to be between a narrow route, discussing issues that only relate to the two superpowers themselves (such as space weapons or strategic nuclear weapons), or a broader route, where also others are invited to the negotiations. 
